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False Claims in Fight Over California’s False Claims Act
by Dennis J. Ventry Jr.
Supporters of California A.B. 1270 proposed 
amending the state’s False Claims Act (FCA) by 
permitting private citizens to inform California 
tax authorities of undetected tax fraud.1 “Tax 
agencies need all the help they can get from the 
public,” former Multistate Tax Commission 
Executive Director Dan Bucks has argued, 
particularly when it comes to fraud that goes 
undetected through traditional tax enforcement 
methods.2 Citizen-whistleblowers could help 
California’s tax authorities catch tax cheats by 
providing unique inside information pertaining to 
undetected tax fraud and noncompliance 
reflecting billions in forgone revenue.3 California 
Attorney General Xavier Becerra (D) sponsored 
the bill, heralding it as a way to combat tax fraud 
and protect taxpayers and the state treasury.4
Specifically, A.B. 1270 applied the California 
false claims statute for the first time to some 
claims involving tax fraud. Whistleblowers would 
have been authorized to bring actions under the 
FCA if damages pleaded exceeded $200,000 and 
the income or sales of the taxpayer alleged to have 
defrauded the state or locality exceeded $500,000.5 
Moreover, the bill required the attorney general to 
consult with and ultimately receive the consent of 
the relevant tax authorities before conducting any 
action.6 Further, if the attorney general declined to 
proceed with the action, the whistleblower who 
initiated the claim could go forward as a qui tam 
plaintiff only after receiving the attorney general’s 
written consent.7
Rather than embrace citizen-whistleblowers 
as a complement to traditional tax administration 
Dennis J. Ventry Jr. is 
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In this article, the 
author reviews the 
business lobbying 
efforts that derailed 
California legislation to 
amend the state’s False 
Claims Act by 
permitting tax claims. He argues that 
opposition to the bill was based on false or 
misleading claims, and that those efforts 
effectively helped conceal tax fraud. Ventry also 
connects the campaign against private 
enforcement of tax laws with recent “anti-
deference” efforts that undercut public 
enforcement of those same laws.
1
The amendments to California’s FCA reflected in A.B. 1270 used 
“taxing authorities” to describe all entities to which a taxpayer might 
make a false claim under the amended statute, including “agencies, 
department, boards, commissions, or other entities responsible for the 
imposition, settlement or administration of any tax, fee, or surcharge 
program under the Revenue and Taxation Code.” See Cal. Govʹt Code 
section 12651(f)(8). This article uses tax authorities, taxing authorities, 
and tax agencies interchangeably.
2
Dan Bucks, “Making Corporate Taxes Work, Part 5: Empowering 
Citizens for Tax Equality,” State Tax Notes, July 29, 2013, p. 283 (further 
stating that “combining the information and initiative of the citizen with 
the established knowledge and expertise of the tax agency is appropriate 
in the realm of taxation”). Id. at 288.
3
The California Franchise Tax Board estimates that the tax gap (the 
difference between tax owed and tax paid) in California was as high as 
$25 billion in tax year 2018. A not insignificant (though fully 
unknowable) percentage of that figure reflects false claims submitted by 
taxpayers to California taxing authorities, claims that A.B. 1270 was 
designed to expose, prosecute, and collect upon. It is important to note 
that the estimated tax gap is likely much smaller than the actual tax gap, 
particularly when it comes to measuring undetected tax fraud.
4
California Attorney General Xavier Becerra release announcing A.B. 
1270 (Apr. 10, 2019).
5
See Cal. Govʹt Code section 12651(f)(8).
6
Id. at section 12651(f)(3).
7
Id.
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and enforcement, California business interests 
strongly opposed A.B. 1270. Their opposition 
ultimately derailed the legislation — effectively 
protecting tax cheats, tacitly condoning 
undetected fraud, and preserving a growing hole 
in the state’s coffers.
In their campaign against A.B. 1270, business 
interests peddled four baseless criticisms, which 
are exposed here. To that end, the article describes 
how business opposition to A.B. 1270 effectively 
concealed tax fraud. At the same time, it reveals 
the business interests’ broader efforts to 
eviscerate not just private — but also public — 
enforcement of tax laws.
False Claim 1: A.B. 1270 Would Apply to Good-
Faith Disputes Over California Tax Laws
According to opponents, tax claims brought 
under an amended California FCA would target 
“good faith errors” and harm taxpayers who 
make “good faith arguments”8 in attempting to 
resolve “legitimate tax disputes” and “credible 
claims.”9
Those assertions are false. In no way 
whatsoever would A.B. 1270 have applied to 
good-faith, legitimate, or credible tax positions.
Like the federal FCA and all 30 state-level 
FCAs, California’s FCA has nothing to do with 
good-faith disputes over the law. Rather, FCAs 
target persons who “knowingly” submit false or 
fraudulent claims against the government, either 
to obtain money or property from the government 
or to avoid paying or transmitting money or 
property to the government.10
Moreover, FCAs define the terms “knowing” 
and “knowingly” as:
• possessing actual knowledge of the false 
facts and information submitted to the 
government;
• acting in deliberate ignorance of the truth or 
falsity of the information; or
• acting in reckless disregard of the same.11
None of those definitions reflects good-faith 
behavior.
If that weren’t enough, A.B. 1270’s 
amendments to the state FCA did not apply to 
taxpayers who either had a reasonable basis for 
their position or relied upon a good-faith 
interpretation of the law (both of which reflect 
low standards of care12) so long as the taxpayer 
had not knowingly submitted false facts to the 
government.13 Further, the legislation created a 
safe harbor for taxpayers who disclosed to 
relevant tax authorities their positions and all 
material facts related to the positions; stated 
differently, the amendments only applied to 
taxpayers who concealed relevant facts or 
falsified disclosed facts.14
Finally, the attorney general’s office worked 
hard to dispel any notion that A.B. 1270 would 
apply to good-faith disputes over the state’s tax 
laws. “This bill does not punish innocent 
mistakes,”15 Supervising Deputy Attorney 
General Rick Acker told the Senate Judiciary 
Committee. “It does not punish people who 
vigorously contest their tax bills but are honest 
with the government. It only punishes people 
who commit tax fraud.”16
The attorney general’s efforts were in vain, 
however, as business interests refused to engage 
8
California Chamber of Commerce to Members of Senate Judiciary 
Committee, Re. A.B. 1270 (Stone) False Claims Act (June 26, 2016).
9
California Society of CPAs to Assembly member Mark Stone, “AB 
1270 (Stone) Expansion of the False Claims Act to Include Tax Matters” 
(June 25, 2019). See also Eric Coffill, “Amending Calif. FCA Is Not the 
Best Way to Fight Tax Gap,” Law360 (Aug. 9, 2019) (stating that A.B. 
1270 applies to “legitimate tax positions”); Civil Justice Association of 
California et al. (CJAC) to Sen. Hannah-Beth Jackson, “Re. AB 1270 
(Stone)” (June 26, 2019) (asserting that A.B. 1270 would apply to a 
“legitimate . . . unsuccessful disagreement over the application of the tax 
law” and tax positions with “credible authority”).
10
See Cal. Govʹt Code section 12650(b)(7).
11
See id. at section 12650(b)(3).
12
The prevailing standards peg “reasonable basis” certainty at 
between 10 and 25 percent likelihood of success on the merits, a level of 
support that although arguable is “fairly unlikely to prevail in court 
upon a complete review of the relevant facts and authority.” H.R. Rep. 
No. 97-760, at 575 (1982) (Conf. Rep.). See also Dennis J. Ventry Jr. and 
Bradley T. Borden, “Probability, Professionalism, and Protecting 
Taxpayers,” 68 Tax Law. 83, 88-90, 113-16 (2014); Sheldon I. Banoff, 
“Dealing With the ‘Authorities’: Determining Valid Legal Authority in 
Advising Clients, Rendering Opinions, Preparing Tax Returns, and 
Avoiding Penalties,” 66 Taxes 1072, 1128 (1988).
13
See Cal. Govʹt Code at section 12651(f)(7). See also section 4(c) (as 
proposed) (“The Legislature finds and declares that a person who has 
not knowingly made, used or caused to be made or used a false claim, 
record or statement, and has not prepared or submitted claims, records, 
or statements that assert an unreasonable position made in bad faith, 
shall not be subject to liability under subdivision (f) of Section 12651 of 
the Government Code [that is, the section that would have added tax 
claims to the FCA].”).
14
Id.
15
Laura Mahoney, “California Bill Would Allow Tax Fraud 
Whistleblowers,” Bloomberg Tax, July 3, 2019.
16
Id.
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on the facts — instead repeating the false mantra 
that A.B. 1270 would apply to good-faith disputes 
over the law.
False Claim 2: Tax Law Is Complex and Uncertain 
— Its Administration and Enforcement Should Be 
Left to Tax Authorities
Critics of A.B. 1270 also observed that 
California’s tax laws “are many and complex and 
are already administered . . . by multiple 
specialized agencies.”17 These agencies — namely 
the Franchise Tax Board and the California 
Department of Tax and Fee Administration 
(CDTFA) — are “well-funded”18 and can deploy a 
battalion of tax attorneys and revenue agents 
“fully capable of dealing with tax fraud.”19
“Tax issues are complicated,” went the refrain, 
and state tax authorities “employ experts capable 
of dealing with complex tax issues, many of 
which are nuanced and often subject to degrees of 
interpretation.”20 Even independent and 
experienced commentators on California politics 
fell under the spell of the business community’s 
beguiling refrain. Dan Walters, for one, wrote in 
his influential CalMatters column that amending 
California’s FCA to include tax claims was 
unnecessary given the state’s “fearsome 
reputation for going after those they deem to be 
avoiding payment.”21
Critics further charged that allowing any 
person or other government entity besides 
California’s tax authorities to enforce the state’s 
tax laws would make it “difficult, if not 
impossible,” for those agencies to “effectively 
administer tax issues, including development of 
cases for litigation and settlement of tax 
disputes.”22 The only solution, critics concluded, is 
for tax authorities to “be the sole entities that 
administer and enforce state and local tax laws.” 
To do otherwise would “usurp[] the authority of 
those agencies” and prevent them from 
“consistently and equitably” administering and 
enforcing the tax laws.23
For a dose of reality, tax is neither special nor 
so unique as to militate against allowing anyone 
but tax authorities to uncover and prosecute 
noncompliance. Yes, complying with tax statutes 
often requires the assistance of paid professionals, 
and the law is constantly changing. But the same 
can be said of other areas of the law, including 
securities, environmental, and health law — all of 
which rely on regimes that encourage and reward 
the participation of whistleblowers in 
enforcement efforts.24
Even if it were true that enforcing tax laws 
should be the sole province of tax authorities — a 
position that tacitly endorses fraud that goes 
undetected by those authorities — A.B. 1270’s 
proposed amendments to California’s FCA 
expressly vested tax enforcement power in the 
state’s tax authorities.
17
Coffill, supra note 9 (stating that the FTB and CDTFA have 100 and 
80 lawyers on staff, respectively).
18
Kyla Christoffersen Powell, “Legislation Will Promote Frivolous 
Shakedown Suits,” Daily Journal, Aug. 29, 2019 (also observing that the 
FTB and CDTFA already “handle tax laws and fraud that fall under their 
purview”).
19
Coffill, supra note 9.
20
Council On State Taxation to California Senate Standing Committee 
on Judiciary, “Re: COST’s Opposition re. AB 1270; Removing the 
Prohibition Against Tax False Claims Act Suits” (June 25, 2019). See also 
Powell, supra note 18 (writing that “tax issues are complicated and are 
best left to taxing authorities to pursue enforcement and prosecution of 
the law”).
21
Dan Walters, “Striking With a Hot Iron,” CalMatters, (Aug. 26, 
2019).
22
Id. See also Powell, supra note 18 (claiming that A.B. 1270 would 
“undermine the good work of our robust state agencies”); Stephen P. 
Kranz, et al., “Vultures Circling as Bill to Expand California FCA to Tax 
Looms in Legislature,” Inside SALT Blog (Aug. 26, 2019) (claiming that 
A.B. 1270 “threatens to open the litigation floodgates and undermine the 
authority of California tax administrators — instead, putting tax 
administration in the hands of for-profit bounty hunters”).
23
COST, supra note 20.
24
For the SEC’s whistleblower program, see the SEC website. For the 
Environmental Protection Agency’s whistleblower program, see the 
Office of the Inspector General website. For whistleblower programs 
pertaining to health law, consider that most states with FCAs cover 
Medicaid fraud under their statutes.
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Specifically, A.B. 1270 obligated the California 
attorney general or relevant prosecuting 
authority25 to consult with the state tax authority 
to whom the alleged false claim was submitted 
before filing or intervening in any action under the 
FCA.26 Further, if the tax authority objected to the 
attorney general proceeding with the claim, A.B. 
1270 prohibited the attorney general from going 
forward.27 And if the attorney general declined to 
intervene in the action, the whistleblower who 
alerted the government to the alleged false claim 
could only proceed with the action on her own if 
the attorney general consented in writing.28
In other words, under A.B. 1270 the attorney 
general could not proceed with a false claim 
involving taxes without both consulting with and 
receiving the express consent of the relevant tax 
authority. Moreover, a whistleblower could only 
proceed with the action on her own if the attorney 
general — after declining to intervene in the 
action either because the tax authority failed to 
give consent or the attorney general decided 
against pursuing the action on its merits — 
granted the whistleblower written consent to 
proceed on her own, a highly unlikely scenario.
So much for the false claim by critics that A.B. 
1270 would “usurp” the power of California’s tax 
authorities or step on authorities’ toes.
Finally, note that no California tax authority 
— including most prominently the FTB and 
CDTFA — objected to A.B. 1270 becoming law. 
Presumably, if the legislation was as disruptive 
and damaging to the power and efficient 
administration of state tax authorities as 
opponents insisted, the affected authorities would 
have raised concerns.
False Claim 3: The Current Tax Penalty Regime Is 
Strong Enough to Deter Tax Fraud
This third false claim is closely related to the 
second. It suggests that the current tax regulatory 
and enforcement regime in California is already 
robust enough, both with compliance burdens as 
well as the deterrent effects and penalties on 
noncompliance. Thus, creating an additional 
enforcement tool would be duplicative and 
unnecessary.
The California Chamber of Commerce, for 
example, asserted that A.B. 1270 represented “a 
solution in search of a problem.”29 The chamber 
was “unaware of any reporting of rampant tax 
fraud in California that would justify new tools 
such as the FCA being utilized.”30 For its part, the 
California Society of CPAs said the state’s 
“already aggressive penalty system . . . 
incentivizes taxpayers to take a cautious position 
on their initial return.”31 Meanwhile, a prominent 
tax attorney at a leading law firm that opposes 
private enforcement of state tax laws while 
supporting weaker public enforcement32 argued 
that the FTB already “has at its disposal 79 
different penalties, including a fraud penalty that 
is imposed at the rate of 75 [percent] of the 
disputed amount,” and that tax authorities can 
criminally prosecute taxpayers for some tax 
violations.33
One can debate the robustness and 
effectiveness of California’s penalty regime and its 
effect on taxpayer behavior. But one thing is 
certain: California does not have a statute that 
25
California’s FCA permits a prosecuting authority to bring claims 
alleging violation of the false claims statute. See, e.g., Cal. Govʹt Code 
section 12652(a)-(b). Prosecuting authority is defined as “the county 
counsel, city attorney, or other local government official charged with 
investigating, filing, and conducting civil legal proceedings on behalf of, 
or in the name of, a particular political subdivision and includes counsel 
retained by a political subdivision to act on its behalf for these 
purposes.” Id. at section 12650(b)(8). Other states similarly permit sub-
state governments or entities to bring actions under their FCAs. New 
York, for instance, authorizes local governments to investigate and 
prosecute civil actions that may have resulted in damages to those local 
governments. See N.Y. State Fin. Law section 190(a). The New York FCA 
defines local government as “any New York county, city, town, village, 
school district, board of cooperative educational services, local public 
benefit corporation or other municipal corporation or political 
subdivision of the state, or of such local government.” Id. at section 
188(6).
26
See Cal. Govʹt Code section 12651(f)(3). Such consultation was 
mandatory:
The Attorney General or prosecuting authority shall consult with 
the taxing authorities to whom the claim, record, or statement was 
submitted prior to filing or intervening in any action under this 
article that is based on the filing of false claims, records, or 
statements made under the Revenue and Taxation Code.
27
See id. Such prohibition was also binding: “The Attorney General or 
prosecuting authority shall not file, or intervene in, any such action if 
such taxing authority objects in writing to such filing or intervention.”
28
See id. (“If the Attorney General or prosecuting authority declines 
to intervene in such an action, the action may only proceed if the 
Attorney General or prosecuting authority consents in writing.”).
29
Robert Moutrie, “CalChamber-Opposed Bill Will Increase 
Frivolous Litigation Against California Businesses,” CalChamber 
Advocacy (Aug. 13, 2019).
30
Id.
31
California Society of CPAs, supra note 9.
32
See infra notes 85-107 and accompanying text.
33
Coffill, supra note 9.
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applies to fraud hidden from state tax authorities. 
Thus, critics who argued against adding tax 
claims to California’s FCA can talk until they are 
blue in the face about being “unaware of any 
reporting of rampant tax fraud in California.” It is 
not reported fraud that false claims statutes 
target, but unreported fraud.
A.B. 1270 would have established a 
mechanism for detecting, investigating, and 
prosecuting undetected fraud. Opponents of A.B. 
1270, on the other hand, preferred keeping such 
fraud unreported, undetected, and unprosecuted.
False Claim 4: A.B. 1270 Would Bring 
‘Frivolous Shakedown Lawsuits’
The A.B. 1270 scaremongering34 reached a 
fever pitch when opponents insisted that adding 
tax claims to California’s FCA would precipitate a 
flood of nuisance suits brought by “circling 
vultures,” otherwise known as whistleblowers 
and members of the plaintiffs’ bar.35
False Claim #4 borrowed from False Claim #1 
(that is, A.B. 1270 applied to good-faith disputes 
over California tax laws) and False Claim #2 (that 
is, A.B. 1270 usurped the authority of state tax 
agencies to administer and enforce complex tax 
laws), both of which lacked merit. Consider the 
following alarmist statements from critics of the 
bill predicting an avalanche of nuisance suits. A.B. 
1270:
• created a “shakedown lawsuit mechanism 
to trap unwary businesses”;36
• included “bounty hunting provisions” 
designed for “plaintiffs’ lawyers” to “extort 
individuals and businesses into paying 
meritless settlements”;37
• “will open the door for a cottage industry of 
financially driven plaintiffs’ lawyers to act 
as bounty hunters,” and “threatens to open 
the litigation floodgates and undermine the 
authority of California tax administrators — 
instead, putting tax administration in the 
hands of for-profit bounty hunters”;38
• “converts the existing system of resolving 
tax disputes into one where government 
and private plaintiffs have the incentive to 
bring False Claims Act cases”;39
• would “lead to numerous lawsuits that 
could overburden the judicial system”;40
• would permit “vague accusations of 
noncompliance with law to lead taxpayers 
to be hailed into court”;41
• would “force” California taxpayers “to 
defend themselves in high-stakes civil 
investigations and/or litigation — even 
when the attorney general’s office declines 
to intervene”;42 and
• would recreate “the potential pitfalls of 
expanding false claims acts to include tax 
claims” as already experienced by 
individuals and businesses in Illinois and 
New York.43
Sounds pretty scary. But almost none of it is 
true.
For starters, A.B. 1270 severely restricted 
access to the courthouse for whistleblowers and 
their attorneys, thereby making the possibility of 
“frivolous shakedown lawsuits” remote. As 
detailed in the discussion of False Claim #1, the 
proposed amendments to California’s FCA 
authorized the attorney general and state tax 
authorities to act as gatekeepers over tax claims 
proceeding under the FCA, and further vested 
state tax authorities with effective veto power 
over tax claims.
Recall that under the proposed FCA 
amendments, the attorney general would have 
34
Powell, supra note 18.
35
See Kranz et al., supra note 22.
36
Powell, supra note 18.
37
Id.
38
Kranz et al., supra note 22. See also COST, supra note 20 (claiming 
that “third parties driven by their own financial interests” would, ipso 
facto, become tax administrators); Powell, supra note 18 (A.B. 1270 would 
“introduce plaintiffs’ attorneys into tax enforcement,” thereby “letting 
fee-seeking plaintiffs’ attorneys enforce tax law”); and Shail Shah et al., 
“California Tax Takes: A Tool to Fight Underpayment Penalties,” 
Law360 (Aug. 19, 2019) (writing that a “cottage industry has already 
developed in California for law firms bringing nontax California FCA 
matters and it is likely the same firms will expand to include tax claims if 
the bill passes”).
39
CJAC, supra note 9.
40
Shah et al., supra note 38.
41
Kranz et al., supra note 22.
42
Id.
43
Shah et al., supra note 38.
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been required to consult with state tax authorities 
before filing or intervening in actions involving 
false tax claims.44 In the event state tax authorities 
objected to the attorney general filing or 
intervening in such an action, the attorney general 
would have been forced to stand down and 
abandon the claim.45 Moreover, if the attorney 
general declined to intervene in an action initiated 
by a whistleblower (either through the attorney 
general’s own volition after evaluating the merits 
of the claim with the help of state tax authorities 
or because tax authorities objected to the attorney 
general intervening), the whistleblower could 
only proceed with the action as a qui tam plaintiff 
if the attorney general consented in writing.46
The statutory framework of the FCA 
contemplated by A.B. 1270 was mandatory 
consultation with state tax authorities for all FCA 
tax claims, mandatory consent from state tax 
authorities to proceed to litigation, and 
mandatory written consent from the attorney 
general permitting whistleblowers to conduct the 
action on their own. These provisions virtually 
guaranteed that only the most meritorious tax 
claims would end up in court.
Opponents of A.B. 1270 were equally off base 
when discussing and invoking the experience of 
states whose FCAs permit tax claims. “In 
countless cases in Illinois and New York,” critics 
offered, “we have seen companies face False 
Claims Act shakedowns and be forced to pay 
nuisance-value settlements.”47 Others critics toed 
the party line: “Cottage industries have 
developed in New York and Illinois, where 
plaintiff-side law firms specialize in finding 
industries or products where the sales tax 
collection obligations are ambiguous and then 
looking for whistleblowers.”48 If A.B. 1270 became 
law, the party line warned, it “would bring the 
horrors experienced in Illinois and New York to 
taxpayers doing business in California.”49
The doomsayers’ invocation of Illinois and 
New York as proof that A.B. 1270 would 
precipitate “frivolous shakedown lawsuits” was 
false and misleading.
Illinois
Comparing the statutory changes to 
California’s FCA contemplated by A.B. 1270 with 
the current Illinois FCA is like comparing apples 
with orangutans.
For its part, A.B. 1270 applied to false tax 
claims only if the taxpayer’s income or sales 
exceeded $500,000 and damages to the state or 
locality exceeded $200,000.50 In other words, the 
income and damages threshold imposed by A.B. 
1270 prevented small-dollar claims against small-
time taxpayers, and instead focused the statute on 
high-dollar tax fraud. In contrast, the Illinois FCA 
— which bars claims as to income taxes but not 
sales and use taxes51 — contains no such filtering 
mechanism to exclude low-dollar nuisance suits. 
Thus, a whistleblower in Illinois could bring a tax 
claim under the state’s FCA alleging $1 of harm 
perpetrated by a taxpayer with $1 in income or 
sales.
No wonder Illinois has experienced what can 
only be described as an onslaught of nuisance 
suits pertaining to tax fraud under its FCA. In fact, 
a single law firm — headed by the media-dubbed 
“king of qui tam,” Stephen Diamond — has filed 
more than 1,000 FCA cases against remote sellers 
alleging fraud for failure to collect sales and use 
taxes.52 In those cases, the law firm filed suit after 
conducting investigations based almost 
exclusively on information already in the public 
domain or after ordering a few items online from 
an out-of-state retailer and then bringing an 
44
See Cal. Govʹt Code section 12651(f)(3).
45
Id.
46
Id.
47
Kranz et al., supra note 22.
48
Shah et al., supra note 38.
49
Kranz et al., supra note 22. See also Shah et al., supra note 38 and 
accompanying text; and California Chamber of Commerce and Civil 
Justice Association of California, “AB 1270 (Stone) False Claims Act, 
Oppose — As Amended August 13, 2019 to Members,” Senate 
Appropriations Committee (Aug. 16, 2019) (stating that “Illinois’ similar 
law provides an example of the potential abuse”).
50
See Cal. Govʹt Code section 12651(f)(1).
51
See 740 Ill. Comp. Stat. 175/3(c). See also 740 Ill. Comp. Stat. 175/3(a).
52
See e.g., Michael Bologna, “Prolific Whistleblower Won’t Get Share 
of Tailors’ Unpaid Tax,” Bloomberg Tax, Feb. 28, 2019; and Bologna, 
“Settlement Data Reveals Lawyer’s False Claims Freight Train,” 
Bloomberg Law, Oct. 19, 2016.
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action when the vendor failed to charge Illinois 
sales tax on the transaction.
Over the last 15 years, these cases have netted 
$30 million in proceeds, penalties, and attorney’s 
fees with the law firm receiving $11.6 million of 
the take. Had the Illinois FCA contained 
thresholds for income or sales of the taxpayer and 
damages pled — like the $500,000/$200,000 
thresholds in A.B. 1270 — almost none of these 
cases would have seen the light of day.
New York
A.B. 1270 opponents assailed New York’s 
FCA, which the State Legislature amended in 
2009 to authorize “claims, records, or statements 
made under the tax law.”53 Critics of A.B. 1270 
pointed to “countless cases” in which New York 
companies faced “shakedowns” and paid 
“nuisance-value settlements.”54 The same 
injustices would befall California businesses 
under A.B. 1270, they warned, with companies 
defending “high-stakes civil investigations and/or 
litigation — even when the Attorney General’s 
Office declines to intervene.”55
Critics pointed to a high-profile case brought 
under New York’s FCA as evidence of the dangers 
a New York-style FCA would bring to California. 
The case at hand resulted in telecommunications 
giant Sprint settling with the state for $330 million 
for knowingly failing to collect and remit state 
and local taxes owed on its flat-rate wireless 
calling plans. According to opponents of A.B. 
1270, the case revealed “the potential pitfalls of 
expanding false claims acts to include tax 
claims.”56
Given that the sponsors of A.B. 1270 looked to 
and relied upon New York’s FCA in drafting 
statutory language to include tax claims under 
California’s FCA, the criticism of New York’s 
purported experience with tax claims played a 
key role in derailing A.B. 1270.
Critics’ characterization of New York’s FCA, 
however, was false and misleading. It was false 
because “countless cases” did not follow New 
York’s decision to add tax claims to the statute. 
According to a recent empirical study, there have 
been a grand total of 17 settlements pertaining to 
tax disputes since the Legislature added tax 
claims to New York’s FCA 10 years ago, 11 of 
which were originated by qui tam plaintiffs57 — a 
far cry from “countless”58 cases opening up the 
“litigation floodgates”59 as A.B. 1270 naysayers 
predicted.
Further, there have been no reports of New 
York qui tam plaintiffs prosecuting tax claims to 
successful completion (that is, receiving a 
settlement or judgment) after the attorney 
general declined to prosecute.60 Moreover, New 
York courts have dismissed five declined cases 
involving a qui tam plaintiff.61 Even the king of 
qui tam has been stonewalled by New York’s 
FCA. Over the last 10 years, while Diamond filed 
hundreds of cases in Illinois involving vendors’ 
failure to collect and remit Illinois sales taxes, he 
filed just one such tax case in New York. And that 
case resulted in the attorney general intervening, 
prosecuting, and securing a settlement of more 
than $1 million.62
Much of New York’s success in preventing 
whistleblowers like Diamond from abusing its 
false claims statute can be attributable to two 
structural aspects of the FCA: (i) high thresholds 
for damages pleaded in the action and income or 
sales of the taxpayer subject to the action, and (ii) 
the collaborative gatekeeper role of the State 
Department of Taxation and Finance and the 
attorney general’s office in filtering out 
unmeritorious claims.
Regarding high thresholds, New York’s FCA 
only permits tax claims with damages pleaded 
53
N.Y. State Fin. Law section 189(4)(a). For the full statute, see N.Y. 
State Fin. Law sections 187-94.
54
Kranz et al., supra note 22.
55
Id. See also supra notes 35-43 and accompanying text.
56
Shah et al., supra note 38.
57
Gregory Krakower, “New York False Claims Act Tax Qui Tams: 
Evidence and Evaluation,” manuscript on file with author. The 17 
settlements resulted in $459 million in recoveries, with the 11 qui tam 
settlements reflecting nearly 95 percent of total recoveries (or $432.1 
million).
58
Kranz et al., supra note 22.
59
Id.
60
Two reported qui tam cases involving taxes have survived motions 
to dismiss and are being litigated. Krakower, supra note 57. See 
Anonymous v. Anonymous, 83 N.Y.S.3d 472 (1st Dept. 2018); State of N.Y. ex 
rel. Campagna v. Post Integrations Inc., aff’d 81 N.Y.S.3d 14 (1st Dept. 2018).
61
Krakower, supra note 57.
62
See New York attorney general release on whistleblower settlement 
(Aug. 17, 2016).
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exceeding $350,000 and taxpayers whose net 
income exceeds $1 million.63 These thresholds 
automatically exclude low-dollar claims while 
focusing on high-dollar tax fraud perpetrated by 
high-income individuals and businesses. By 
contrast, the Illinois FCA contains no thresholds 
for damages pleaded or taxpayer’s income and 
sales, a structural deficiency that allowed 
Diamond to establish a business model for his 
law firm focused almost exclusively on low-
dollar claims.
As to the gatekeeper role of state tax 
authorities and the attorney general, New York’s 
FCA obligates the attorney general to consult 
with the tax department before filing or 
intervening in an action pertaining to the state’s 
tax laws.64 That consultation injects tax expertise 
into the administrative and enforcement process 
and filters out unmeritorious claims while 
flagging meritorious ones.
It is worth pointing out that the amendments 
to A.B. 1270 contained even stronger gatekeeper 
provisions than New York’s FCA. Specifically, the 
amendments to California’s FCA would have 
required the attorney general to not only consult 
with the relevant tax authorities, but also receive 
consent before filing or intervening in any action.65 
Also, if the attorney general declined to prosecute 
the action, the whistleblower in the matter could 
only proceed on her own if the attorney general 
consented in writing.66
Finally, opponents of A.B. 1270 
mischaracterized the Sprint case in the same false 
and misleading way that they equated the Illinois 
FCA with California’s FCA as amended by A.B. 
1270. Far from reflecting “the potential pitfalls of 
expanding false claims acts to include tax 
claims,”67 Sprint illustrates the benefits of 
reinforcing traditional tax enforcement with 
whistleblowers whose unique information can 
assist tax authorities in uncovering and 
prosecuting undetected tax fraud.
The Sprint case began in 2011 when a 
whistleblower filed suit against Sprint under New 
York’s recently amended FCA. Together, the New 
York attorney general and tax department 
conducted a yearlong investigation into the 
whistleblower’s allegations — ultimately 
converting the case into a civil enforcement action 
in 2012. Later, three New York courts rejected 
Sprint’s efforts to dismiss the lawsuit,68 and the 
U.S. Supreme Court declined to hear Sprint’s 
appeal.69 In December 2018 Sprint settled with 
New York for $330 million for knowingly failing 
to collect and remit state and local taxes owed on 
its flat-rate wireless calling plans.
In the words of New York’s attorney general:
Sprint knew exactly how New York sales 
tax law applied to its plans — yet for years 
the company flagrantly broke the law, 
cheating the state and its localities out of 
tax dollars that should have been invested 
in our communities.70
Internal documents uncovered by the state 
during its investigation indicated that Sprint:
• knew it owed tax on the calling plans 
(knowledge also privy to its in-house tax 
lawyers);
• had previously paid the proper amount of 
sales tax owed on the plans;
• reversed course at some point and stopped 
paying the proper amount;
• ignored formal guidance issued by the tax 
department clearly indicating that Sprint’s 
practices were illegal; and
• further ignored a ruling from New York’s 
highest court holding that the tax statute 
Sprint knowingly violated was 
unambiguous.
Thus, far from embodying the fallacies of 
permitting tax claims under state FCAs, the Sprint 
case — and more broadly, New York’s successful 
63
See N.Y. State Fin. Law section 189(4)(a)(i)-(ii).
64
See id. at section 189(4)(b). Also, in the event the attorney general 
declines to participate in an action, the qui tam plaintiff must obtain 
approval from the attorney general before motioning a court to compel 
the tax department to disclose the accused taxpayer’s tax records. Id.
65
See Cal. Govʹt Code section 12651(f)(8).
66
Id.
67
Shah et al., supra note 38.
68
See People v. Sprint Nextel, 26 N.Y.3d 98 (Ct. of App. of N.Y. 2015); 
People v. Sprint Nextel, 980 N.Y.S.2d 769 (N.Y. App. Div. 2014); and People 
ex. rel. Schneiderman v. Sprint Nextel, 970 N.Y.S.2d 164 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2012).
69
Sprint Nextel Corp. v. New York, 136 S. Ct. 2387 (2016), cert. denied.
70
New York attorney general release on Sprint settlement (Dec. 21, 
2018).
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tax enforcement actions over the last 10 years 
initiated by whistleblowers71 — is a story of the 
statute working as planned; that is, with citizen 
whistleblowers complementing traditional tax 
enforcement methods by rooting out otherwise 
undetected tax fraud and exposing tax cheats.
Opponents’ Motives and Hypocrisy
Concealing Tax Fraud
Thus, A.B. 1270 would not have:
• applied to good-faith disputes over 
California tax laws;
• usurped the administrative and 
enforcement functions of state tax 
authorities;
• duplicated the existing penalty regime; or
• brought an onslaught of nuisance suits.
So why were its opponents so scared about its 
passage?
The answer may lie in one of the few truthful 
statements opponents uttered. Specifically, critic 
after critic railed against the possibility that 
taxpayers could face liability for tax fraud in a 
post-A.B. 1270 world even after the taxpayer 
received a clean audit from tax authorities, 
entered into settlement agreements, participated 
in voluntary disclosure programs, or otherwise 
seemingly closed an issue.72 Indeed, opponents 
portrayed A.B. 1270 “as a hunting license that 
would force unsuspecting taxpayers to defend 
themselves even when tax authorities have 
cleared them of fraud accusations.”73 This 
treatment amounted to “double jeopardy”74 (with 
taxpayers facing liability for tax positions that 
authorities had blessed) and even “triple 
jeopardy” (defending accusations “from the 
agency, the attorney general, and private 
parties”).75
Putting aside for a moment the provocative 
though factually inapt use of the terms “double 
jeopardy” and “triple jeopardy,” opponents of 
A.B. 1270 were right to fear a tax enforcement 
regime in which taxpayers can be held liable for 
fraudulent tax positions after disclosing or 
resolving those positions with tax authorities. In 
fact, we already live in that world — and 
opponents of A.B. 1270 are well aware of that 
reality.
Consider “closing agreements” with the IRS. 
These agreements between the IRS and a taxpayer 
— binding on both parties but not subject to the 
law of contracts — assist the taxpayer in 
correcting a prior-year error, mistake, or 
misinterpretation of the tax law or a filing 
requirement. They are designed to provide 
finality as to a dispute or controversy between the 
taxpayer and the IRS, with one exception:
Closing agreements are final and issues 
resolved in a closing agreement will not be 
reopened, annulled, modified, set aside, or 
disregarded by the federal government or 
the courts for tax years covered by a 
closing agreement (except in cases of fraud, 
malfeasance or misrepresentation of material 
fact on the part of the taxpayer).76
That’s right, closing agreements can be 
reopened if the taxpayer entered into the 
agreement fraudulently, with malfeasance, or by 
misrepresenting any material fact associated with 
tax positions covered by the agreement. This 
makes sense:
• the tax authority entered into an agreement 
based on a set of facts provided by the 
taxpayer;
71
For a sampling of New York’s successful tax enforcement actions 
initiated by citizen-whistleblowers, see the list of Taxpayer Protection 
Bureau releases on the New York attorney general website.
72
See e.g., Kranz et al., supra note 22 (writing that A.B. 1270 applied to 
tax positions “even when the position was resolved through the 
California Department of Tax and Fee Administration, the State Board of 
Equalization, the Franchise Tax Board or a local government. Settlement 
agreements, voluntary disclosure agreements and audit closing 
agreements all would be disrupted if the AG or a plaintiffs’ lawyer 
believes the underlying tax dispute or uncertainty is worth pursuing 
under the CFCA”); Moutrie, supra note 29 (“AB 1270 fails to include any 
protection for a taxpayer who has already handled a transaction with the 
taxing agencies. For example, if a taxpayer is audited and no issues are 
found, the taxpayer still could face an FCA lawsuit years later if AB 1270 
becomes law.”); Powell, supra note 18 (lamenting that “plaintiffs’ 
attorneys can still sue when a taxpayer has had a clean audit or settled 
an issue with a taxing agency”).
73
Walters, supra note 21.
74
See, e.g., Moutrie, supra note 29 (“This double jeopardy issue makes 
concerns about profit-driven plaintiff’s attorneys all the more apparent 
— regardless of whether the taxing agencies have signed off on a 
taxpayer’s documents, that taxpayer is still at risk of a lawsuit.”).
75
Coffill, supra note 9.
76
IRS, ITG Voluntary Closing Agreement Process (emphasis added).
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• the actual facts were different and known to 
the taxpayer but not to the tax authority;
• the tax authority may or may not have 
entered into the same agreement had it been 
privy to the actual facts; and therefore
• the tax authority has the right to invalidate 
or otherwise alter the agreement.
Further, and most relevant to our discussion 
here, information provided by whistleblowers 
offers the most likely (and perhaps only) source 
for tax authorities to learn of the actual facts and 
uncover the fraud after signing a closing 
agreement. In this sense, whistleblowers are not 
as far outside the framework of traditional tax 
administration and enforcement as opponents of 
A.B. 1270 would have us believe.
For good reason, A.B. 1270 naysayers fear 
whistleblowers exposing false facts and 
undetected fraud. Information that 
whistleblowers provide tax authorities can set 
aside closing agreements, reopen audits, modify 
settlement agreements, and annul voluntary 
disclosure agreements. More than any other 
source, information possessed by whistleblowers 
can subject taxpayers to liability long after they 
have escaped liability for their undetected fraud.
A recent case underscores this possibility for 
critics of A.B. 1270. The taxpayer at issue had 
signed closing agreements to settle tax liabilities 
with both the state and city of New York. The 
agreements were “final, conclusive and 
irrevocable for the liabilities of the Taxpayer for 
the subject taxes, penalties, interest and Audit 
Period.”77 By their terms, however, the agreements 
did not release the taxpayer from actions 
amounting to “fraud, malfeasance or 
misrepresentation of material fact.”78
A whistleblower brought an action under 
New York’s FCA alleging that the taxpayer 
knowingly submitted false and fraudulent tax 
returns pertaining to a captive insurance tax 
shelter. The taxpayer argued that the closing 
agreements with New York tax authorities barred 
the whistleblower’s claims for the years covered 
by the agreements. But the court ruled that to the 
extent the taxpayer’s liability under the FCA was 
predicated upon a showing of “fraud, 
malfeasance or misrepresentation of material 
fact,” the whistleblower’s claims were not barred 
because the closing agreements did not release the 
taxpayer from those actions.79
While A.B. 1270 opponents might decry the 
outcome in this case as an example of the taxpayer 
facing double jeopardy, that characterization 
would be false. Closing agreements with tax 
authorities expressly permit them to revisit 
agreements in the event new facts emerge 
indicating a taxpayer entered into the agreement 
fraudulently. Similarly, the double jeopardy 
defense requires that a defendant who was 
previously acquitted or convicted show that she is 
about to be tried for a second time on the same or 
similar charges and typically involving the same 
set of facts. In both instances, if the facts are 
different, all bets are off. Thus, to the extent 
whistleblowers provide tax authorities with new 
facts about a taxpayer, the finality of closing 
agreements can be invalidated and the double 
jeopardy defense falls apart.
The claim that taxpayers would have been 
subject to triple jeopardy under A.B. 1270 (with 
taxpayers defending accusations “from the agency, 
the attorney general, and private parties”) is even 
more preposterous.
Recall that A.B. 1270 required the attorney 
general to consult with and receive consent from the 
relevant tax authorities before proceeding with a tax 
claim brought by a whistleblower. To the extent 
authorities consented to the attorney general 
converting the claim into a civil enforcement action, 
the attorney general would assume responsibility 
for conducting the action (presumably in 
coordination with tax authorities).80 Alternatively, if 
the attorney general declined to proceed with the 
action and the claim involved funds of a political 
subdivision,81 the prosecuting authority82 of the 
77
Anonymous v. Anonymous, 83 N.Y.S.3d 472, 476 (Sup. Ct. of N.Y. 1st 
Dept. 2018).
78
Id.
79
Id. at 480.
80
See Cal. Govʹt Code section 12652(a)-(c).
81
See id. at section 12650(b)(6) (defining political subdivision as “any 
city, city and county, county, tax or assessment district, or other legally 
authorized local governmental entity with jurisdictional boundaries”).
82
See id. at section 12650(b)(8) (defining prosecuting authority as the 
“county counsel, city attorney, or other local government official charged 
with investigating, filing, and conducting civil legal proceedings on 
behalf of, or in the name of, a particular political subdivision”).
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political subdivision could intervene and assume 
responsibility for conducting the action.
All of those procedural permutations mean 
that a whistleblower can become a qui tam 
plaintiff conducting the action only if the attorney 
general declines to prosecute the action, the 
prosecuting authority declines to intervene (when 
political subdivision funds are at issue), and the 
attorney general consents in writing to the 
whistleblower prosecuting the action.83 Under 
A.B. 1270, a taxpayer would never have been 
forced to defend accusations from three sources at 
the same time. Instead, potential opponents 
would only include:
• the attorney general working alongside tax 
authorities in a single action;
• a prosecuting authority; or
• the whistleblower turned qui tam plaintiff.
At the end of the day, and after wading 
through the posturing and hyperbole of business 
interests opposed to A.B. 1270, it is hard not to 
conclude that private sector opposition embraces 
a view of tax enforcement that goes something 
like this:
If traditional methods of enforcement fail 
to catch taxpayers’ false facts and 
undetected fraud, those taxpayers should 
be in the clear, free from ever having to 
worry about being held liable for their 
fraud and misrepresentation.
Whistleblowers and false claims statutes 
complicate that worldview, so much so that the 
forces working to conceal false facts and fraud are 
right to be afraid.
Faux Deference to Deference
While fighting to prevent tax fraud from being 
exposed by whistleblowers, critics of A.B. 1270 
went out of their way to praise California tax 
authorities.
The state’s administration of its tax laws, 
according to the California Chamber of 
Commerce and the Civil Justice Association of 
California in an opposition letter signed by a 
slew of business organizations, is “handled by 
taxing agencies with expertise in taxes, well-
developed procedures, and no profit-motive.”84 
The chamber also lauded the current dispute 
resolution regime for producing “efficient, 
consistent resolution of tax disputes.”85 For its 
part, the Council On State Taxation said 
California tax authorities “employ experts 
capable of dealing with complex tax issues, 
many of which are nuanced and often subject to 
degrees of interpretation.”86 Reading from the 
same script, corporate law firms that defend the 
business opposition to A.B. 1270 noted that 
California’s “many and complex” tax laws are 
“already administered” by “multiple specialized 
agencies . . . fully capable of dealing with tax 
fraud.”87
The overriding message from critics of A.B. 
1270 was that in contrast to “the efficiency of tax 
agencies’ review and appeal process,”88 
permitting tax claims initiated by 
whistleblowers under California’s FCA would be 
a disaster. Indeed, while condemning private 
enforcement of tax laws, critics exalted public 
enforcement.
Or so it seemed. The truth is that many of the 
same voices praising California’s “expert,” 
“specialized,” “efficient,” “consistent,” “fully 
capable,” and “well-funded” tax authorities 
have been hard at work gutting not just private 
enforcement of tax laws but also public 
enforcement.
Specifically, two legal powerhouses have 
formed coalitions to eliminate judicial deference 
to agency rules with a special focus on tax rules, 
particularly state tax rules.89 McDermott Will & 
Emery has launched the Deference Coalition,90 
83
See id. at section 12652(c)(6)(B). Again, the one caveat to this process 
is if, after the attorney general has declined to conduct the action, a 
prosecuting authority of a political subdivision intervenes and converts 
the claim into a civil enforcement action.
84
California Chamber of Commerce and Civil Justice Association of 
California et al., supra note 49.
85
California Chamber of Commerce, supra note 8.
86
COST, supra note 20.
87
Coffill, supra note 9 (Coffill is senior counsel at Eversheds 
Sutherland). See also Kranz, supra note 22 (lamenting that A.B. 1270 
would “undermine the authority of California tax administrators”). 
Kranz is partner at McDermott Will & Emery.
88
California Chamber of Commerce, supra note 49.
89
Paige Jones, “Law Firms Launch Coalitions to Tackle Judicial 
Deference,” State Tax Notes, May 27, 2019, p. 790.
90
See, e.g., McDermott Will & Emery, “An Uneven Playing Field: 
Judicial Deference to State Tax Administrator Interpretations” (May 13, 
2019).
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while Eversheds Sutherland formed the Reform 
Administrative Deference (RAD) Coalition.91 
Neither firm has revealed the membership rolls 
of its coalitions except to say they include 
businesses and trade associations.92 Both firms 
claim (without providing any empirical data) 
that judicial deference to state tax authorities’ 
statutory interpretation “has played a 
determinative role in state tax litigation”93 and 
“put[s] taxpayers at a disadvantage in both 
judicial and nonjudicial tax disputes.”94
There are important differences between each 
firm’s anti-deference efforts. McDermott’s 
Deference Coalition focuses on limiting the 
deference courts give to “subregulatory” 
guidance promulgated without following a state’s 
Administrative Procedure Act.95 Eversheds 
Sutherland’s RAD Coalition represents a 
considerably more radical campaign that seeks to 
“eliminate deference across the country,”96 
including all forms of guidance — even full-
blown regulations. As part of its effort, Eversheds 
Sutherland attacks a long-standing judicial 
justification for agency deference, namely an 
agency’s specialized subject matter expertise,97 by 
arguing that such expertise — if it exists at all — 
is unnecessary for adjudicating tax disputes at the 
state level because “many states have specialized 
tax tribunals.”98
Moreover, according to Eversheds 
Sutherland, state tax agencies are less interested 
in leveraging tax expertise when evaluating tax 
positions than in fulfilling their “mission . . . to 
collect revenue.”99 In other words, state tax 
authorities are neither expert nor impartial, and 
their legal interpretations deserve no deference.
Critics of these anti-deference campaigns 
counter that the efforts are ideologically 
motivated and wrong on the facts. According to 
Darien Shanske, the campaigns amount to “an 
ideological attempt to reduce the power of 
governments to function,”100 while Peter D. Enrich 
has called the efforts “part of a broad attack on the 
basic notion that government needs to be 
conducted through administrative agencies that 
need to fill in a level of detail and bring a level of 
expertise” that legislatures and courts cannot be 
expected to bring.101 Critics also challenge the law 
firms’ claims that judicial deference to state tax 
authorities prevents judges from independently 
interpreting the law,102 and that state tax 
authorities are more worried about maximizing 
revenue than effectuating legislative intent under 
the tax laws.103
I highlight this debate over the proper amount 
of judicial deference to state tax authorities because 
the law firms behind the anti-deference coalitions 
were also vocal critics of A.B. 1270. Indeed, 
McDermott and Eversheds Sutherland peddled all 
the criticisms of A.B. 1270 that this article set out to 
disprove.104 Moreover, in arguing against A.B. 1270 
and private enforcement of the tax laws, both law 
firms argued in favor of keeping California’s tax 
authorities — “specialized agencies . . . fully 
91
See, e.g., Eversheds Sutherland, “Our Ideas Are Taking Off: Finding 
Success in Efforts to Eliminate Administrative Deference in State Tax 
Matters.”
92
Jones, supra note 89, at 790.
93
Maria M. Todorova, Eric S. Tresh, and Justin T. Brown, “It’s Time to 
Balance the Scales: Chevron Deference,” Tax Notes State, July 8, 2019, p. 
103.
94
Id. See also Eversheds Sutherland, “Eversheds Sutherland’s 
Coalition to Reform Administrative Deference (RAD) Updates Georgia 
Legislative Efforts and Announces Expansion to Additional States” 
(claiming that judicial deference to state tax authorities “prevents courts 
from exercising independent judgment and violates fundamental 
principles of separation of powers and due process”).
95
Jones, supra note 89, at 791 (summarizing remarks by Kranz that 
McDermott’s coalition is focused on “subregulatory guidance such as 
regulations, tax bulletins, and notices issued by revenue departments 
that don’t follow an APA on tax disputes”).
96
Id.
97
See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council Inc., 467 
U.S. 837, 865-66 (1984).
98
Todorova et al., supra note 93.
99
Id. at 108. See also id. at 103 (stating that judicial deference 
“encourages state tax administrators’ propensity to maximize tax 
revenue associated with ambiguous tax statutes”); id. at 108 (claiming 
that a state tax authority’s interpretation of law is “clouded by its search 
for new tax revenue” and the “prevention of refunds from the 
treasury”).
100
Bucks, Peter D. Enrich, Michael Mazerov, and Darien Shanske, 
interviewed by Doug Sheppard, “The Anti-Deference Fallacy,” Tax Notes 
State, Sept. 2, 2019, p. 913.
101
Id.
102
Id. at 914, 919 (quoting Bucks, “the notion that deference is a bar 
that is keeping judges from making their own interpretation of the law is 
. . . just not correct or true in actual practice,” and “judges are not at all 
restrained by some supposed magic deference wand wielded by tax 
agencies”).
103
Id. at 915 (quoting Enrich, such a view of state tax authorities “isn’t 
a reasonable description of what they do,” and “it simply isn’t a fair 
description of state agencies that they’re acting primarily out of a 
revenue-maximization motivation”).
104
See Coffill, supra note 9, also available on the Eversheds Sutherland 
website. See also Todorova et al., supra note 93. See Kranz et al., supra note 
22.
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capable of dealing with tax fraud”105 — as the sole 
guardians of administering and enforcing those 
laws.
In other words, while the law firms worked to 
gut public enforcement of state tax laws through 
their anti-deference coalitions, they also 
condemned private enforcement of state tax laws 
by praising the same public agencies they have 
been hellbent on weakening. Three observations 
flow from the law firms’ hypocrisy:
• First, while it is not inconsistent to dislike and 
condemn both private and public 
enforcement of tax laws, it is certainly 
obnoxious.
• Second, it is inconsistent and disingenuous 
to, on the one hand, praise public 
enforcement of tax laws while condemning 
private enforcement of those laws and, on the 
other hand, mount a withering campaign 
against public enforcement.
• Third, and ironically, the law firms’ anti-
deference campaign (which has the direct 
result of weakening public enforcement of 
tax laws) makes the case for private 
enforcement that much stronger. Stated 
differently, the argument for permitting tax 
claims under a state’s FCA becomes more 
persuasive — perhaps even necessary — if 
the regulators are not empowered to perform 
their jobs.
Conclusion
It is unclear whether the sponsors of A.B. 1270 
plan to initiate another legislative effort in 2020 to 
add tax claims to California’s FCA. If they do, we 
can expect critics of A.B. 1270 to redouble their 
opposition and to spread more misinformation 
about the effects of permitting private citizens to 
help tax authorities combat tax fraud through 
whistleblowing. Those of us who support 
supplementing public enforcement of tax laws 
with private enforcement of those laws need to be 
prepared to refute critics’ false information and to 
highlight the benefits of tax whistleblowing.
We should also be ready to offer policy 
alternatives to amending California’s FCA to 
include tax claims. The most viable alternative 
to the litigation model reflected in false claims 
statutes would involve embracing an 
administrative solution such as a stand-alone 
whistleblower statute similar to the IRS 
whistleblower program.106 Indeed, some 
opponents of A.B. 1270 lauded the IRS program 
as a counterpoint to A.B. 1270, and suggested 
that if the California State Legislature wanted to 
promote and reward private enforcement of the 
tax laws, “the goal of motivating 
whistleblowers and addressing tax fraud can be 
accomplished by simply adopting (and 
funding) a tax whistleblower program similar 
to the very successful programs offered by the 
IRS and many other states.”107
We will have to see if these voices are as 
sanguine about getting behind a tax 
whistleblower statute if and when California 
lawmakers tackle the issue again. 
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Coffill, supra note 9. See also Kranz et al., supra note 22 (arguing to 
preserve “the authority of California tax administrators” in 
administering and enforcing the state’s tax laws).
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The IRS program, reflected in 26 U.S.C. section 7623, is widely 
regarded as a success, particularly after Congress amended the statute in 
2006. See Tax Relief and Health Care Act of 2006, P.L. 109-432 section 406, 
120 Stat. 2922, 2958-60. For the last 10 years, the enhanced IRS 
whistleblower program recovered nearly $4.5 billion in tax revenue and 
paid out more than $770 million in awards to whistleblowers. See IRS, 
“Whistleblower Program Fiscal Year 2018 Annual Report to Congress,” 9 
(2019); IRS, “IRS Whistleblower Program Fiscal Year 2015 Annual Report 
to the Congress,” 11 (2015); and IRS, “U.S. Department of Treasury, 
Fiscal Year 2012 Report to Congress on the Use of Section 7623,” 17 
(2013). See also Whistleblower-Informant Award. For additional 
commentary of the IRS whistleblower program, see Ventry, “Stitches for 
Snitches: Lawyers as Whistleblowers,” 50 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 1455, 1477-85 
(2017); Ventry, “Not Just Whistling Dixie: The Case for Tax 
Whistleblowers in the States,” 59 Vill. L. Rev. 425, 490-97 (2014); and 
Ventry, “Whistleblowers and Qui Tam for Tax,” 61 Tax Law. 357, 357-68, 
370-82 (2008).
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See Kranz et al., supra note 22.
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